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RECENT CASE NOTES
seem to be a result contrary to the spirit of the statute, namely, protecting
the worker from risks of industrial accidents, in the course of their em-
ployment.'S
The principle case is correct on authority19 and also on policy. A man
calling another to do an odd job for him cannot obtain insurance save
at a rate out of all proportion to the risk insured against. The cost of
underwriting demands that no policy be issued except at a substantial
premium; a premium often greater than the whole wages paid the workman.
In addition the necessity often arises suddenly and gives no time to secure
insurance. The average man, in spite of any presumption that the law
may indulge in, is ignorant even of the most discussed legislation. To
impose compensation under these circumstances in every case where a
man hires another to do an odd job, might be to entrap a moderately pros-
perous citizen into financial ruin.20 A. S. M.
PLEADINGS-CONSTRUCTION OF COMPLAINT AND OF A PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
-In two recent Indiana cases the question of the construction of the
pleading has been involved. In an action by a Massachusetts corporation
against a Missouri corporation upon a note signed in St. Louis payable
in Massachusetts, the defendant filed a plea in abatement questioning the
jurisdiction of the court; although, property of the defendant had been
attached under Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Section 981. From a judgment
abating the action the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the trial court had
jurisdiction and that a plea in abatement is a dilatory plea, construed
without any intendments in its favor.1
In another recent case, an action for an injunction, the several defend-
ants filed joint and several demurrers. The trial court sustained the
demurrers as to all the defendants, and the plaintiff, having refused to
plead further, appealed. Held, in reversing the judgment as to all the
defendants except one; the trial court said that such words as "dangerous,
hazardous, perilous, and unsafe" are conclusions of fact, and may be
considered in determining the sufficiency of a complaint as against a
demurrer for want of facts; while, such words as "wrongfully, unlawfully,
arbitrarily, void, illegal, etc.," are legal conclusions and cannot be con-
sidered in determining the sufficiency of the complaint as against a
demurrer.2
The common law rule was that pleadings were to be construed against
the pleader.3 However, a more liberal rule is to be preferred, one that
will give effect to all the material allegations whenever reasonably possible.4
Thus the liberal rule of construction which our code of civil procedure
attempts to establish seems to be highly desirable. The statute says,
"In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its
%811 Cal. L. T. 238.
19 See note 8 and note 12, supra.
"11 Cal. L. R. 221, 237.
'Dodgem Corporation v. D. D. Murphy Shows, Inc., Appellate Court of Indiana,
Dec. 23, 1932, 183 N. E. 699.
Regester v. Lincoln Oil Refining Co., et al., Appellate Court of Indiana, Jan. 4,
1932, 183 N. 1,. 693.
$Burrows v. Yount (1843), 6 Blackford 458.
"Flint, etc. Manufacturing Co. v. Beckett (1906), 167 Ind. 491, 79 N. E. 505.
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effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial
justice between the parties; but when the allegations of a pleading are
so indefinite that the precise nature of the charge or defense is not
apparent, the court may require the pleadings to be made definite and
certain by amendment". 5 This rule of liberal construction of the pleadings
has not always been applied. 6 Thus what would seem to be the correct
rule in Indiana is that pleadings are construed against the pleader only
when that is necessary to do substantial justice between the parties, but
that at all other times a liberal construction should be given the pleadings.7
It can be seen that there has been some limitation placed upon the statute
as construed by the courts, for they have not applied it as literally and
liberally as they might have done. Whether or not a more liberal con-
struction of the statute would have been more desirable is a debatable
question and one which is unnecessary to attempt to answer here.
Thus in the Dodgem Case supra, the court was following the rule as
laid down by the cases when it stated that the plea in abatement must
be strictly construed with no intendments in its favor.8 This was the
common law rule; but in view of the statute upon construction it is very
luid to logically sustain this position, since a plea in abatement is a
pleading to abate the action, and the statute says that in the construction
of a pleading its allegations must be liberally construed. However, no
Indiana case has been found where the court has suggested that the statute
upon liberal construction should be applied to a plea in abatement.
In ruling upon a demurrer for want of facts the test has been that
"a demurrer admits the truth of all facts well pleaded, but it does not
admit conclusions of law, nor all conclusions which may be drawn from
such facts by the pleader."9 This seems to have been the test that the
court had in mind in the Regester Case, supra, when it made the distinction
between conclusions of law which were not considered in determining the
sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action and the conclusions
of fact which were admitted as true as facts well pleaded. Another
statute says "Hereafter, in any pleadings * * * where the sufficiency
of the same can, may be or is called in question * * * all conclusions
stated therein shall be considered and held to be the allegations of all the
facts required to sustain said conclusions when the same is necessary to
the sufficiency of such pleadings".10 Upon reading the statute literally,
it is very difficult to see any logical reason for making the distinction
between the rule as applied to conclusions of fact and conclusions of law.
5Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 403.
6Mjers v. Henderson (1932), 181 N.E. 729; State ex rel. Mackenzie V. Casteel
(1886), 110 Ind. 174, 11 N. E. 214; Davis v. Overman (1916), 184 Ind. 647, 112
N. E. 243; Seymour Water Co. v. Lebline (1924), 195 Ind. 481, 114 N. E. 30; State
ex rel. Miller v. Peterson (1905), 36 Ind. App. 269, 95 N. E. 602; Wabash R.. Co. V.
McNown (1913), 53 Ind. App. 116, 100 N. E. 393.TDickesheets v. Eaufman (1867), 28 Ind. 251; Smith v. Borden (1903), 160
Ind. 233, 66 N. E. 498; Domestic Coal Co. v. DeArmey (1913), 179 Ind. 592, 100
N. E. 675; Heritage v. State (1909), 43 Ind. App. 595, 81 N. E. 114; Lautenaohlager
v. Walgsmotl (1923), 80 Ind. App. 198, 137 N. E. 781.
'National etc. Co. v. Wolfe (1914), 59 Ind. App. 418, 106 N. E. 390; Callahan
Co. v. Wall, etc. Co. (1909), 44 Ind. App. 372, 89 N. B. 418.
9Morton v. The City of Aurora (1932), 182 N. E. 259.
"o Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 360.
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One author writing upon the subject shortly after the above statute was
enacted says, "It was formerly the rule that conclusions stated in a plea
were not admitted to be true. But this rule has been changed by the
statute * * *".11 Undoubtedly it would be very desirable to have the
courts construe the statute in question so that "all conclusions" would be
admitted, without making any distinction between the kinds of conclusions.
It must have been the purpose of the statute to have all conclusions con-
sidered when necessary to the sufficiency of the complaint when ruling
upon demurrer. But it seems that a conclusion of fact is really nothing
more than an operative fact, and if so, Section 360 as construed adds
nothing to the general statute upon liberal construction which was enacted
long before section 360 was amended. C. A. R.
REAL PROPERTY-TENANCY IN COMMoN-LIFE INTEREST--JuDICIAL SALE
-PARTITIoN.-The appellants, tenants in common with appellees' decedent,
holder of a life interest, in a partition proceeding, prayed for a sale of
realty, alleging its indivisibility. Appellees' decedent, prior to her death,
admitted its indivisibilty and asked that the present value of her life
estate be determned upon the sale of the realty. On June 24, 1925 the
court ordered the realty to be sold. One piece of property was sold in
November 1925; the other, a farm, was not sold until September 1928.
Appellees' decedent filed a petition December 6, 1928, asking the court
to determine the present value of her life estate in one-third of the net
proceeds pf the sale of the realty and for an order directing the com-
missioners to pay her the amount determined. Appellees' decedent died
December 7, 1928. Appellees then filed a similar petition. Appellants
filed an answer setting out the death of the appellees' decedent and assert-
ing that her interest, even after the confirmation of the sale, was still realty
and terminated at her death. The principal question is--When realty,
held by tenants in common, is petitioned to be sold on a partition proceeding
does the conversion of the realty into personalty take place on the confirma-
tion of the sale or when the proceeds of such sale are actually distributed?
Held, that the conversion of the realty into personalty is effected on the
confirmation of the sale.1
Although it seems that the question as to the time of conversion of
realty into personalty in a partition proceeding has never been decided
in this jurisdiction before the instant case,2 yet it has been held that a
surviving second wife, without issue, is entitled, on a sale of land in such
proceeding, to one-third of the proceeds of such sale, reduced to a sum
equal to the present value of her life estate.3
An examination of the authorities reveals conflicting views, as to just
when the conversion of realty into personalty is effected on a sale in a
partition proceeding. It has been held in England and in some of our
jurisdictions that an absolute order of sale within the jurisdiction of the
1 Watson's Revlsion of Works Practice and Forms, Watson, B. F., vol. 1,
Sec. 543.1 Buschbaum v. Hale, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 27, 1932, 182 N. E. 93.
2Supra, note 1.
, wain v. Hardin (1878), 64 Ind. 85; Russell -v. Russell (1874), 48 Lad. 456;
Ooquillard v. Coquillard (1916), 62 Ind. App. 426, 113 N. D1. 481.
